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Let’s Try This Again, Separate
Educational Facilities Are Inherently
Unequal: Why Minnesota Should Issue a
Desegregation Order and Define
Adequacy in Cruz-Guzman v. State
Christie Geter†
Introduction
Nikole Hannah-Jones,1 a reporter for The New York Times,
remembers watching the nightly news in 2014. 2 Eighteen-year-old
Michael Brown had just been shot and killed by a Ferguson police
officer. His mother, Lezley McSpadden,3 was “standing in a crowd
of onlookers, a few feet from where her son was shot down, where
he would lie face down on the concrete for four hours, dead,” and

†. J.D. University of Minnesota Law School, 2019; B.A., University of New
Mexico, 2012. The author expresses her appreciation to Professor Myron Orfield and
JaneAnne Murray for their guidance and support, as well as the staff and editors of
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their dedication in preparing
this article for publication. The author would also like to thank her parents, Larry
and Val for their strength and tenacity in overcoming obstacles, support, and
encouragement for their children, and faith and hope in a better tomorrow.
1. Nikole Hannah-Jones, https://nikolehannahjones.com [https://perma.cc/
BKR7-XSEN] (“Nikole Hannah-Jones is an award-winning investigative reporter
covering racial injustice for The New York Times Magazine . . . .”) She investigates
the way racial segregation in housing and schools is maintained through official
action and policy. Nikole Hannah-Jones, Choosing a School for My Daughter in a
Segregated City, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2016/06/12/magazine/choosing-a-school-for-my-daughter-in-a-segregated-city.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/WV7T-ADN9] (“I rode the bus an hour each morning across
town to the ‘best’ public school my town had to offer . . . . I have no doubt my parents’
decision to pull me out of my segregated neighborhood school made the possibility of
my getting from there to here — staff writer for The New York Times Magazine —
more likely.”).
2. This American Life: The Problem We All Live With—Part One, CHI. PUB.
RADIO (July 31, 2015) (downloaded using iTunes) [hereinafter This American Life].
3. Lezley McSpadden ran for Ferguson city council in 2018. Though she did not
secure one of the six council seats, she garnered national attention for the historic
run. See Eli Rosenberg, ‘This Is One of My First Steps’: Michael Brown’s Mother Plans
to Run for Ferguson City Council, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2018, 9:18 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/08/10/this-is-one-of-myfirst-steps-michael-browns-mother-plans-to-run-for-ferguson-city-council/?utm
_term=.03faaf4ad73d [https://perma.cc/8AAM-J658].
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she said, “You took my son away from me. You know how hard it
was for me to get him to stay in school and graduate? Do you know
how many [B]lack men graduate? Not many!”4 Hannah-Jones
recalls, “of all the ways [McSpadden] could have expressed her grief
and outrage, this is what was on her mind[—]school, getting her son
through school.”5
Hannah-Jones began investigating the Normandy school
district in Missouri, which Michael had attended. The optics were
not great. “Each year, the Missouri Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education puts out a report that shows how each of its
520 school districts is doing. It’s a numeric snapshot of the type of
education students are receiving.”6 In 2014, Normandy received
zero points in math, English, science, social studies, and college
placement.7 The district received just 10 points out of the 140 points
possible.8 Hannah-Jones describes these ten points as “points just
for existing.”9 It is no surprise that the Normandy school district
lost its accreditation.10 What is a surprise, however, is that this
“event triggered a little-known Missouri law called the transfer
law.”11 Under the transfer law, students in the Normandy school
district had the option of staying at Normandy or busing into other,
Whiter, districts.12 “Most [B]lack kids will not be shot by the police
but many of them will go to a school like Michael Brown’s . . . almost
completely [B]lack, almost completely poor, and failing badly.”13
Normandy, Missouri, is not an outlier. Racial segregation in
schools is not simply a problem of the South, reflecting old adages
of political divides. Here in Minnesota, the largest school districts
in the state are almost completely segregated.14 States all across the
4. This American Life, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. John Gordon, Teresa Nelson, William Z. Pentelovich & Jesse D. Mondry,
Counterpoint: ‘Education Clause’ Lawsuit Simply Asks the Legislature to Do Its Duty,
STAR TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2018, 5:59 PM), http://www.startribune.com/counterpointeducation-clause-lawsuit-simply-asks-the-legislature-to-do-its-duty/497299441/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/XTS6-JK73] (“Minnesota has some of the worst achievement gaps in
the country between [W]hite children and children of color. Our children of color are
far behind their [W]hite peers, and segregated schools are part of the problem. Our
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nation have been re-segregating, and much faster than they were
ever desegregating. In efforts to combat the inequalities of minority
schools, “education finance litigation [has] traditionally [been]
divided into three waves: federal equality litigation, state equality
litigation, and state adequacy litigation.” 15 In the past decade a
fourth wave of education finance litigation has begun, seeking a
federal adequacy right.16 The cruxes of these suits have asked: ‘Do
minority schools have equal funding? Do they have adequate
funding?’ These cases are seemingly unwilling to ask if racial
segregation alone can create a poor education.
Part I of this Note will provide background information,
including: (1) social science that repeatedly links inequalities in
education to lifelong barriers creating stress on the United States;
(2) a brief history of the United States’ sordid relationship with
school segregation; and (3) the four waves of litigation attempting
to right past wrongs. Part II will introduce a current Minnesota case
that asks if racial segregation alone can create an inadequate
education. Part III will analyze other states’ responses to
inequalities in public schools under the four waves framework. Part
IV analyzes Minnesota’s civil rights legacy in context with current
segregation lawsuits. Part V argues that for a remedy to come to
fruition, the Minnesota Supreme Court will need to define what an
adequate education encompasses and issue a desegregation order
for the first time in almost fifty years.
I.

Background

Inequalities in education have a rippling effect creating
instability across the United States. Consequently, the United
States addressed this issue more than a half a century ago, but poor
enforcement has prevented any major progress. Litigation has
persisted over the past seven decades in an effort to alleviate these
inequalities.

country’s painful history has taught us that separate is not equal.”); Complaint at 9–
12, Cruz-Guzman v. State, No. 27-CV-1519117 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d, 892 N.W. 2d
533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), rev’d, 916 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018) [hereinafter CruzGuzman Complaint].
15. Lauren Nicole Gillespie, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation:
Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 991
(2010).
16. Id. at 991, 1015.
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A. Social Science Repeatedly Links Inequalities in
Education to Lifelong Barriers.
The effects of an inadequate education are costly, not just to
the individual, but to the United States. In fact, it would be more
expensive to leave education policy in its current form than to invest
the time and resources into fixing it. 17 Inadequate education
negatively affects the economy and increases the costs of criminal
justice and healthcare.18 These effects pervade society, creating an
unstable environment.
i.

Inadequate and Segregated Education is a Costly
Correlative to Criminal Justice.

With an ever-increasing prison population, much of the
country has called for criminal justice reform for two primary
reasons: (1) over-incarceration for low-level drug offenses leads to
recidivism and unstable family units, and (2) it is expensive.19 In
2013, the “Council on Black Minnesotans found that state taxpayers
spend more than $48,000 per prison inmate per year, just less than
a year of tuition at Carleton College, the highest tuition in the
state.”20
Over two-thirds of men incarcerated in the United States have
not completed high school.21 The two are no doubt correlated, but, if
there is a causal relationship, which is the dependent variable? In
other words, “do youth drop out of school because they want to sell
drugs all day or do they sell drugs because they dropped out of

17. See Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin, The Education Attainment Gap:
Who’s Affected, How Much, and Why It Matters, in THE PRICE WE PAY 1, 2 (Clive R.
Belfield et al. eds., 2007). (“[P]oor education leads to large public and social costs in
the form of lower income and economic growth, reduced tax revenues, and higher
costs of public services such as health care, criminal justice, and public assistance.
Therefore we can view efforts to improve educational outcomes for at-risk
populations as public investments that may yield benefits considerably in excess of
investment costs.”) (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. Enrico Moretti, Crime and the Costs of Criminal Justice, in THE PRICE WE
PAY 142 (Clive R. Belfield et al. eds., 2007).
20. Brandt Williams, High School Dropouts Try to Get Back in the Game, MPR
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2016, 12:05 AM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/03/07/
graduation-gap-dropout [https://perma.cc/RQ6H-BGHA].
21. Kathryn Hanson & Deborah Stipek, Schools v. Prisons: Education’s the Way
to Cut Prison Population, MERCURY NEWS (May 16, 2014), https://www.mercury
news.com/2014/05/15/schools-v-prisons-educations-the-way-to-cut-prison-populatio
n/ [https://perma.cc/9QKS-YYJW] (“Nationally, 68 percent of all males in prison do
not have a high school diploma.”).
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school?”22 Lochner23 suggests the latter, i.e., increased education
leads to reduced propensity to engage in criminal activity, 24 for four
main reasons. First, education raises individual income, making
crime and incarceration costlier for the individual. 25 Second,
education may directly affect how crime is perceived by the
perpetrator, either positively or negatively. 26 Third, education may
increase an individual’s patience, lowering their propensity for
risky behavior.27 Fourth, education affects “the social networks or
peers of individuals” and Locher suggests that dropping out of
school may introduce an individual to peers who exacerbate
tendencies to engage in criminal activities. 28 Further study
coincides with Lochner’s assessment, revealing that “schooling
significantly reduces criminal activity.”29 Furthermore, if dropout
rates amongst men improved by just one percent, 30 such
improvement could save the United States “$1.4 billion per year in
reduced costs from crime incurred by victims and by society at
large.”31
ii. Healthcare Expenditures Increase with Inadequate
Education.
Education has a large impact on a person’s health and in the
aggregate has a large impact on the United States’ healthcare
system.32 With more education comes higher incomes, more
22. Lance Lochner, Education and Crime, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
EDUCATION 5 (Penelope Peterson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008), https://economics
.uwo.ca/people/lochner_docs/educationandcrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH4Q-Q4PJ].
23. Lance Lochner is a professor of economics at the University of Western
Ontario whose many publications address the cross-sections of crime, education,
race, and poverty. Dep’t of Econ., Lance Lochner, W. UNIV. SOC. SCI.,
https://economics.uwo.ca/people/faculty/lochner.html [https://perma.cc/8N2T-8UJS].
24. Lochner, supra note 22, at 5 (“For most crimes (except, possibly, white collar
crimes), one would expect these forces to induce a negative effect of schooling on
crime.”).
25. Id. at 9. In other words, the more they gain, the more they have to lose.
26. See id. at 3 (“To the extent that schools ‘socialize’ students to become better
citizens and to treat others better, education may also reduce the psychic returns to
crime causing individuals to forego lucrative criminal opportunities.”).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 4–5 (“Youth who drop out of school may be influenced by a more
negative set of peers, which may exacerbate any tendencies to engage in crime.
Similarly, youth who join gangs or who otherwise engage in crime may be encouraged
to leave school by their peers.”).
29. Moretti, supra note 19, at 157.
30. Id. (referring specifically to 1% of all men ages 20–60).
31. Id.
32. See VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., CTR. ON SOC’Y & HEALTH, WHY EDUCATION
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resources, social and psychological benefits, healthier behaviors,
and healthier neighborhoods.33 The reverse is also true: “job
insecurity, low wages, and lack of assets associated with less
education can make individuals and families more vulnerable
during hard times—which can lead to poor nutrition, unstable
housing, and unmet medical needs.”34 One study found that
individuals with the “lowest educational attainment exhibited the
highest prevalence of risk factors” for cardiovascular disease.35
Additionally, the Center on Society and Health found a negative
correlation between education and “health-harming stresses.”36 The
Center’s Director, Dr. Steve Woolf, stated, “only about ten percent
of our health outcomes are determined by healthcare.”37 One of the
initiatives at the Center is to “help people in the healthcare field
understand the importance of education as a potential strategy for
preventing disease and lowering healthcare costs.” 38

MATTERS TO HEALTH: EXPLORING THE CAUSES, 3–5 (Apr. 2014) [hereinafter VA
COMMONWEALTH UNIV., WHY EDUCATION], https://societyhealth.vcu.edu/media/
society-health/pdf/test-folder/CSH-EHI-Issue-Brief-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TR2-Q7
93] (“Americans with more education live longer, healthier lives than those with
fewer years of schooling.”). The Center on Society and Health began in 2007 and was
chartered by the Board of Visitors at Virginia Commonwealth University. The
Center is an “academic research center that studies health implications of social
factors—such as education, income, neighborhood, and community environmental
conditions, and public policy.” VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., CTR. ON SOC’Y & HEALTH,
About Us, https://societyhealth.vcu.edu/about/ [https://perma.cc/G4N5-6QSC].
33. See VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., WHY EDUCATION, supra note 32, at 3–5.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Marilyn A. Winkleby et al., Socioeconomic Status and Health: How
Education, Income, and Occupation Contribute to Risk Factors for Cardiovascular
Disease, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 816, 817 (June 1992) (comparing education,
occupation, and income as independent variable measures on cardiovascular
disease); see also Peter Muennig, Consequences in Health Status and Costs, in THE
PRICE WE PAY 128 (Clive R. Belfield et al. eds., 2007) (assessing the impact of
education on mortality rates and government healthcare spending).
36. See id. at 4.
37. Va. Commonwealth Univ., Ctr. on Soc’y & Health, Why Education Matters to
Health: Exploring the Causes, YOUTUBE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://youtu.be
/V3rsdBBFAN8 [https://perma.cc/P4AR-KXP2] (quoting Dr. Steve Woolf, Director,
VCU Center on Society and Health) (“If we really want to save lives in this country
and prevent disease and reduce health care costs, we have to do something about
education.”).
38. Id.
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iii. Persistent Achievement Gaps Will Destabilize the
United States’ Economy.
It is no surprise that the level of education a person receives is
correlated to their income,39 with high school dropouts being in the
bottom tier of income earners.40 As the United States continues to
grow more diverse, these correlations may have new consequences.
The 2020 projections by the Census Bureau reveal a “77 percent
increase for the Hispanic population, a 32 percent increase for the
African American, a 69 percent increase for the Asian population,
and a less than 1 percent increase for the [W]hite population.”41
Additionally, a study done in 2000 revealed:
[B]lack and Hispanic students are less likely to get to twelfth
grade; if they do, they are less likely to enroll in college; and if
they do enroll, they are less likely to earn ten credits. Moreover,
they are less likely to enroll in a B.A.-granting institution, and
if they do, they are less likely to complete a degree.42

These two statistics taken together mean that the United
States is facing “significant growth in the population that has not
even graduated high school.”43 These projections, continued through
2050, reveal that “racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups that are
overrepresented among low achievers and underrepresented among
high achievers [will] make up the majority of the population and the
workforce.”44 This growing population without high school
39. See Thomas Bailey, Implications of Educational Inequality in a Global
Economy, in THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
INADEQUATE EDUCATION 76 (Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007)
(“Reformers have linked education and economic growth for many years, predicting
economic problems resulting from inadequate education.”).
40. See VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., WHY EDUCATION, supra note 32, at 3
(“[W]orkers with more education tend to earn more money. In 2012, the median wage
for college graduates was more than twice that of high school dropouts and more
than one-and-a-half times higher than that of high school graduates.”).
41. Bailey, supra note 39, at 89. The sources cited in this paper utilize the term
Hispanic when referring to Latinx individuals. As such, the author uses the term
Hispanic interchangeably with Latinx in order to avoid confusion with the language
in the sources.
42. Id. at 87.
43. Id. at 89.
44. Ronald F. Ferguson, Toward Excellence with Equity: The Role of Parenting
and Transformative School Reform, in THE PRICE WE PAY 225, 226 (Clive R. Belfield
et al. eds., 2007) (“By 2050 racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups that are
overrepresented among low achievers and underrepresented among high achievers
will make up the majority of the population and the workforce. Even more than
today, technology and trade will pit workers head-to-head in competition with others
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education translates to fewer skilled workers, greater health
risks,45 higher taxes, and a less competitive economy globally. 46 It
is crucial that the United States takes steps now to close
achievement gaps between races in order to correct this path.
B. The United States Has Been Grappling with Inequalities
in Education for over Sixty Years.
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion, wrote “Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.”47 Some well-meaning and some not-so-well-meaning
school districts tried desegregating schools, but the experiment
quickly failed. In 1955, Brown II cut the legs out from the previous
decision with three simple words: “all deliberate speed.”48 Spoken
by the Attorney General of the United States, these words
proscribed remediation of segregation policies in a flexible window,
deviating from the previous mandate and allowing state
legislatures and school systems to delay and even curtail
integration of public schools.49 Another decade would pass before
the Supreme Court stated, “The time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has
run out.”50
C. Four Waves of Litigation All Seek to Right Past Wrongs.
While the country was still reeling from the effects of Brown I
and Brown II, the first wave of education litigation began. The

around the world. The elderly will be more numerous. When young parents lack
reading, math, and job skills to avoid poverty, they will compete with the elderly poor
for public supports. Tax burdens on working-age adults are likely to be high.
Meanwhile, internationally, the most elevated standards of living will obtain in
nations where workers are most skilled and politics most stable. Where the United
States will rank in this mix is uncertain. It depends on us. More than we might like
to acknowledge, the social stability and vitality of the nation we leave our children
depends fundamentally upon how relentlessly and effectively we pursue excellence
with equity now and over the next several decades.”).
45. See VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., WHY EDUCATION, supra note 32, at 2
(“[P]eople with less education are more likely to work in high-risk occupations with
few benefits.”).
46. See Bailey, supra note 39, at 76–79.
47. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Brown I is
a hallmark of American law, representing some of the most deeply held values in our
society, but the hope it prescribed remains an illusion. Accord Jim Chen, Poetic
Justice, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 581, 581–83 (2006).
48. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 300, 301 (1955).
49. See Chen, supra note 47, at 582–83, 588.
50. Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
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Burger-led51 Supreme Court found that the United States
Constitution neither explicitly nor implicitly provides a
fundamental right to an education. 52 The Court held, “[T]he
importance of a service performed by the State does not determine
whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of
examination under the Equal Protection Clause.” 53 This holding is
directly adverse to Brown’s reasoning, putting an impetus on the
importance of education when it held that separate facilities led to
unequal educational opportunities. 54 This decision foreclosed the
possibility of bringing a federal equality of education lawsuit under
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
Consequently, future plaintiffs were left to bring these grievances
through state constitutional claims. Unlike the United States
Constitution, all fifty states’ constitutions have education clauses,55
and the San Antonio decision opened the door to the second wave of
education litigation.56
The second wave of litigation mirrored that of San Antonio but
focused on education clauses in state constitutions. 57 For example,
in Leandro v. State, plaintiffs sued the State of North Carolina and
the State Board of Education, claiming a violation of the right to an
“equal educational opportunit[y].”58 The North Carolina Supreme
51. Chief Justice Burger replaced Chief Justice Earl Warren and his decidedly
activist tenure on the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger, a Minnesota native, was
nominated by President Nixon and ushered in a new conservative era. Warren E.
Burger: U.S. Supreme Court Justice: Overview, MINN. HISTORY CTR., GALE FAMILY
LIBRARY, https://libguides.mnhs.org/burger [https://perma.cc/6NAX-VDJT].
52. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1973).
53. Id. at 30.
54. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
55. Molly A. Hunter, State Constitution Education Clause Language, EDUC.
JUSTICE, http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/State%20Constitution%20Ed
ucation%20Clause%20Language.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT87-MDMK]; Emily Parker,
Constitutional Obligations for Public Education, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES
(Mar. 2016), https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-Constitutional-obligati
ons-for-public-education-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DJW-VRKC].
56. See Catharine Hansard, Searching for the Missing Piece: An Examination of
the Constitutional Language in Texas’s Education Clause that Continues to Fuel the
Puzzling School Finance Saga, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. ONLINE EDITION 1, 2 n.7 (2016)
(“While the Supreme Court of the United States declined to recognize education as a
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, every state constitution contains an education clause, and all states
require children to enroll in school with the ultimate goal of preparing students to
graduate from high school ready to attend college.”).
57. See Gillespie, supra note 15, at 998 (“Litigants in the earliest state court suits
continued to make an equality-based argument, now grounded in the equal
protection clauses of various state constitutions.”).
58. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. 1997); see infra notes 106–108;
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Court found that there was nothing in the state’s constitution to
mandate equal funding,59 but did find there was a qualitative
component mandating a “sound basic education.” 60 On the other
hand, in Texas, the state supreme court found that the financing
scheme created unequal access to educational materials violating
the state’s constitution.61 The second wave of education was met
with varied success for plaintiffs. With more courts willing to define
adequacy or, in Leandro’s case a “sound basic education,” a third
wave of litigation began.
The third wave was comprised of state adequacy litigation
lawsuits, which were premised on qualitative components that
articulated the type of education state constitutions prescribed. For
example, in Kentucky, plaintiffs sued claiming the state financing
system failed to provide adequate educations to all students. 62 The
state supreme court decisively found in favor of plaintiffs stating,
“A child’s right to an adequate education is a fundamental one
under our Constitution.”63 The court then defined ‘adequate’ using
seven criteria that the state had to provide to fulfill its obligation
under the Kentucky Constitution.64 Similarly, in Kansas, the state
supreme court found that the legislature had violated the state
constitution, as its financing scheme failed to provide adequate
education for all students. 65 Unlike Kentucky, the Kansas
legislature has grappled with this ruling for a decade, and remains
in noncompliance with the court’s mandate. 66 Adequacy lawsuits
sidestepped the issue of equality, but, like the second wave of
lawsuits, they sought resolution through state financing.
The new fourth wave of education litigation seeks what the
San Antonio decision left many thinking was impossible: a federal
see also infra note 106 at 342.
59. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 256–57 (“[W]e see no reason to suspect that the
framers intended that substantially equal educational opportunities beyond the
sound basic education mandated by the Constitution must be available in all
districts. A constitutional requirement to provide substantial equality of educational
opportunities in every one of the various school districts of the state would almost
certainly ensure that no matter how much money was spent on the schools of the
state, at any given time some of those districts would be out of compliance.”).
60. Id. at 254–55.
61. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). But see
infra notes 135–141 and accompanying text.
62. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989).
63. Id. at 212.
64. Id. at 212–13; see infra notes 149–162 and accompanying text.
65. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1239 (Kan. 2014).
66. See infra notes 163–171 and accompanying text.
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right to an adequate education. This wave differs from the first
wave because the crux is not equality of education, but adequacy.
For example, in Michigan a group of high-school students sought a
federal right to literacy.67 The court ultimately dismissed the
complaint with prejudice, holding the state was not required to
provide a minimally adequate level of education, nor was there a
fundamental right to literacy under the United States
Constitution.68 While this outcome left some disheartened, many
believe there is a groundswell of opinion and precedent to find a
federal right to an adequate education in the near future.69
These four waves of litigation highlight the inequalities of
education and each seeks a change in financing schemes. After sixty
years of lawsuits, however, is financing really the answer?
Minnesota’s most urban school districts, Minneapolis and St. Paul,
are receiving more funding than any other district in the state. 70
Yet their students are falling far behind their suburban
counterparts.71 Nikole Hannah-Jones has investigated school
districts across the United States, all parroting the same new
strategies: magnet programs, earning college credit in high school,
improving teacher quality, replacing principals, and implementing
more testing.72 She said, “[Y]ou could take these conversations and
go from district to district to district, and you will always hear the
same things.”73 All these solutions are financing-based resolutions,
and none have effectively reduced the achievement gap between

67. Gary v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 2018) superseded
by, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (stating plaintiffs alleged they were denied
the right of access to literacy under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the United States Constitution).
68. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 366; see infra notes 177–193 and accompanying
text.
69. See Gillespie, supra note 15 at 1010 (“[T]he Court has supported students’
receipt of a meaningful educational opportunity and shown a willingness to consider
and articulate the features that contribute to an adequate education.”).
70. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Minn. 1993) (explaining the higher
property tax rate of commercial entities going towards Minneapolis and St. Paul
schools); see also Megan Burks, Minnesota’s School Funding Formula Provides Some
Students of Color Less than Their White Peers, MPR NEWS (Mar. 5, 2019, 5:56 PM),
https://www.mprnews.org/listen?name=/minnesota/news/features/2019/03/05/school
_funding_20190305_128.mp3 [https://perma.cc/EJ77-QN9N] (“Overall, Minnesota
districts with mostly students of color receive 8 percent more funding than
predominantly white districts . . . .”).
71. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 20.
72. This American Life, supra note 2.
73. Id.
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White and minority students.74 In her research, Hannah-Jones
found “one thing that really worked, that cut the achievement gap
between black and white students by half. . . . But it’s the one thing
that we are not really talking about, and that very few places are
doing anymore . . . [i]ntegration.”75
II. Cruz-Guzman v. State Seeks Injunction to State
Sponsored Segregation.
On November 5, 2015, seven individuals 76 and one non-profit
organization77 sued the state of Minnesota,78 claiming the state had
perpetuated a pattern of discrimination among its school systems,
resulting in segregated institutions and inadequate educations. The
complaint alleged violations of the equal protection, 79 due process,80
and education81 clauses of the Minnesota Constitution, resulting in
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Plaintiffs are Alejandro Cruz-Guzman, guardian and next friend of his three
minor children, who attend St. Paul schools; Me’Lea Connolly, guardian and next
friend of her three minor children, who attend Minneapolis schools; Ke’Aundra
Johnson, guardian and next friend of her minor child, who attends a Minneapolis
school; Izreal Muhammad, guardian and next friend of his two minor children, who
attend a Northern suburb school; Roxxanne O’Brien, guardian and next friend of her
two minor children, who attend a Hawthorne neighborhood school in Minneapolis;
Diwin O’Neal Daley, as guardian and next friend of his two minor children, who
attend a Seward neighborhood school in Minneapolis; and Lawrence Lee, as
guardian and next friend of his two minor children, who attend a Saint Paul school.
Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 4–5.
77. One Family One Community is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation whose
purpose is to ensure and provide for adequate educational opportunities for
economically-disadvantaged children and children of color. Cruz-Guzman
Complaint, supra note 14, at 5.
78. The Defendants collectively referred to as “the State” were originally
comprised of the State of Minnesota; Minnesota Department of Education; Dr.
Brenda Cassellius, Commissioner of Minnesota Department of Education; Mark
Dayton, Governor of Minnesota; Minnesota Senate; Sandra L. Pappas, President of
the Minnesota Senate; Minnesota House of Representatives; and Kurt Daudt,
Speaker of the Minnesota House of Representatives. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra
note 14, at 5–7. But see Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 5 n.2 (Minn. 2018)
(“The district court dismissed Governor Dayton from this suit based on separationof-powers concerns. The district court also dismissed the two individual legislators,
concluding that they are ‘immune in this suit’ under the Speech or Debate Clause of
the Minnesota Constitution, Minn. Const. art. IV, § 10. The dismissal of these
defendants is not at issue in this appeal.”).
79. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No member of this state shall be disfranchised or
deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by
the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.”).
80. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.”).
81. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government
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de jure and de facto segregation82 across Minnesota schools. 83
Additionally, the complaint brought claims under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act84 for “unlawful discrimination in education on
the basis of race and status.”85 The state contended the complaint
should be dismissed “on multiple grounds, including lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and failure to join all interested persons.”86 The district
court dismissed the Human Rights Act claims 87 brought against
three defendants on the ground of legislative immunity, 88 but
denied the state’s motion in all other respects. The state then
appealed, claiming the district court erred in four separate ways:
(1) by refusing to dismiss the claims against the Minnesota Senate
depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature
to establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The legislature shall
make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient
system of public schools throughout the state.”).
82. See Segregation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining de facto
segregation as “[s]egregation that occurs without state authority, usu. on the basis
of socioeconomic factors” and de jure segregation as “[s]egregation that is permitted
by law.”); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1411–
12 (Choper et al. eds., 12th ed. 2015) (“[I]ntentional (or ‘de jure’) discrimination may
exist even though the law in question is racially ‘neutral’ on its face: the law may be
deliberately administered in a discriminatory way; or the law, although neutral in
its language and applied in accordance with its terms, may have been enacted with
a purpose (or motive) of disadvantaging a ‘suspect’ class.”). Compare Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding the enforced separation of the races is a
legitimate exercise of each state’s police power), abrogated by Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 438, 494–95 (1954) (“Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this
finding is rejected . . . . We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”), with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(holding San Francisco municipal code, though facially neutral, served to
discriminate against Chinese laundromat owners), and Keyes v. School Dist., 413
U.S. 189 (1973) (holding that school boards cannot rely on racially neutral
explanations when defending accusations that segregated schools are the result of
intentional segregation, rather than “racially neutral” policies).
83. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 28–33.
84. Minn. Human Rights Act § 363A.13, subd. 1 (“It is an unfair discriminatory
practice to discriminate in any manner in the full utilization of or benefit from any
educational institution, or the services rendered thereby to any person because of
race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, status with
regard to public assistance, sexual orientation, or disability . . . .”).
85. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 2.
86. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018).
87. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“The
district court also dismissed respondents’ claim under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act, concluding that respondents lacked standing.”).
88. Id. (“The district court dismissed the complaint as to Governor Dayton,
Senate President Pappas, and Speaker Daudt, concluding that they are entitled to
legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Minnesota
Constitution.”).
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and House of Representatives on legislative immunity grounds; 89
(2) by refusing to dismiss the complaint in its entirety due to a
nonjusticiable political question; 90 (3) by refusing to dismiss the
complaint because of a failure to join all interested parties; 91 and (4)
by refusing to dismiss the complaint because the state of Minnesota
is “not a proper party defendant.”92 Judge Larkin of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held for the State, finding the complaint brought
a nonjusticiable political question. Because this finding was
dispositive, the court did not reach the state’s other contentions.93
The plaintiffs then sought review by the Minnesota Supreme Court,
and the state sought cross-review for further clarification on the
issues not addressed by the appellate court, including legislative
immunity and proper joinder of parties.94 The Minnesota Supreme
Court granted the petitions for review and cross-review and
ultimately reversed the appellate court’s holding, finding that the
plaintiffs’ claims under the due process, equal protection, and
education clauses of the Minnesota Constitution were justiciable. 95
Additionally, the court found that the Minnesota Senate and House
of Representatives were not entitled to immunity, nor did the suit
require the joinder of other interested parties. 96
In Cruz-Guzman v. State the court was set to determine the
fate of all segregation and adequacy in education lawsuits while
navigating the tumultuous waters of the separation of powers
doctrine. If the court shied away from its decision here and held, as
the appellate court did, that the plaintiffs’ claims were
nonjusticiable, the legal remedy to state sponsored segregation of
primary and secondary schools would be nonexistent. In addressing
the justiciability question, the court stated, “Deciding that
appellants’ claims are not justiciable would effectively hold that the
judiciary cannot rule on the Legislature’s noncompliance with a
constitutional mandate, which would leave Education Clause
claims without a remedy.”97 Consequently, the court did not intend
to step into the legislature’s shoes and determine education policy,

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W. 2d at 12–13.
Id. at 7–10.
Id. at 13–15.
Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 536.
Id. at 541; Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 6.
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 7.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 9.
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rather, it intended to operate as a check and balance on the
legislature’s duty to fulfill the mandate given to it by the Minnesota
Constitution.98 Additionally, the court held that the joinder of school
districts and charter schools was not necessary to pursue the
litigation.99 This decision is important because the court effectively
held the state responsible for the adequacy of educating Minnesota’s
students—adequacy which, the complaint alleges, is failing due to
hyper-segregated schools throughout the Minneapolis and St. Paul
areas.100 If, as the state purported, the school districts and charter
schools were deemed necessary parties, the state could deflect
blame onto particular school policies and avoid its responsibility for
rolling back desegregation efforts and implementing new
segregative measures.101 The court was not asked to rule on
whether the state had violated the equal protection, due process,
and education clauses of the Minnesota Constitution, but because
of the court’s strong and decisive ruling on the fundamental issues
above, plaintiffs are now able to pursue their claims in district
court.
III. There Is No Remedy to Segregated Schools Except
Integration.
The four waves of education litigation all seek to remedy the
achievement gap between White and minority students, but all
hesitate to point the finger directly at segregation. The second and
third waves focus on state financing schemes, after the San Antonio
decision knocked down a federal right to education. 102 The fourth
wave returns to the United States Constitution, this time seeking a
98. Id. at 8–9 (“In fact, the Education Clause is the only section of the Minnesota
Constitution that imposes an explicit ‘duty’ on the Legislature.”).
99. Id. at 14.
100. The plaintiffs detail in their complaint that “children of color comprise only
approximately 29 percent of Minnesota’s public school population,” but Minneapolis
schools are comprised of “66 percent children of color” and St. Paul schools are
comprised of “78 percent of children of color.” In fact, twenty-seven Minneapolis
schools have populations of at least 80% children of color, and in St. Paul, thirty
schools have populations of at least 85% children of color. Meanwhile charter schools
are operating almost entirely on racially segregated grounds. Forty-two charter
schools in Minneapolis and St. Paul have populations over 95% children of color, and
twenty-seven charter schools have populations over 80% White children. The
complaint contrasts these numbers of hyper-segregated schools in Minneapolis and
St. Paul with the neighboring suburbs, expounding on graduation and employment
rates stemming from segregated versus non-segregated schools. Cruz-Guzman
Complaint, supra note 14, at 7–15.
101. See infra notes 233–239 and accompanying text.
102. Supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text.
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right to adequate teachers, facilities, and resources as opposed to
equality.103 With mixed results, education litigation has, thus far,
left minority Americans on shaky ground.
A. Second Wave: Equality in State Financing Leads to
Decades of Litigation with Little Change for Students.
The Supreme Courts of North Carolina and Texas reached
opposite conclusions when equality was sought under their
respective state constitutions. The North Carolina Supreme Court
found nothing in the state’s constitution that mandated the equal
financing of schools,104 whereas the Texas Supreme Court found the
state’s financing scheme created unequal access to educational
materials in violation of the state’s constitution. 105
i.

North Carolina Struggles with Decades of Litigation
Where Equal Financing is Not Required by State
Constitution.

In 1997, in Raleigh, North Carolina, the state supreme court
held that two provisions of the state constitution “combine to
guarantee every child . . . an opportunity to receive a sound basic
education in . . . public schools.”106 In Leandro v. State,107 the court
further itemized particular factors that create a “sound basic
education,” including the ability to read, write, speak English, and
having sufficient knowledge of mathematics, science, history,
geography, economics, politics, and vocational skills. 108 Seven years
later, as the legislature struggled to implement a funding system
sufficient to accomplish these goals, the court again reviewed the
issue, this time holding that the state’s new funding scheme did not
appropriately identify and fund “at-risk”109 students as to provide
them an opportunity to a “sound basic education.”110 The court also
took the opportunity to applaud the trial court’s judicial restraint
by stating the court did not “dictate how existing problems should

103. Complaint at 24–25, Gary v. Snyder, 313 F. Supp. 3d 852 (E.D. Mich. 2018),
superseded by, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018) [hereinafter Snyder
Complaint].
104. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 256 (N.C. 1997).
105. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
106. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 391–96 (N.C. 2004).
110. Id. at 390.
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be approached and resolved . . . [r]ecognizing that education
concerns were the shared province of the legislative and executive
branches . . . .”111 Despite the progress, subsequent litigation has
lasted over two decades.
In 2012, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed a
trial court’s decision to order the unrestricted admission of “at-risk”
four-year-olds into existing pre-kindergarten programs.112 A year
later this decision was dismissed and the appeal vacated because of
the legislature’s amendments to the pre-kindergarten program.113
Then in 2017, both parties to the on-going saga jointly requested an
independent consultant be appointed by the court. 114 This
consultant would work with the newly appointed Governor’s
Commission on Access to Sound Basic Education to “assist in the
development of a comprehensive plan to address compliance with
the constitutional mandates set forth in [Leandro]” and “develop
specific recommendations as to the means to achieve such
compliance.”115 Most recently, Judge David Lee denied a motion
from the State Board of Education asking to be dismissed from the
case. He stated in part:
There is an ongoing constitutional violation of every child’s
right to receive the opportunity for a sound basic education.
This court not only has the power to hear and enter appropriate
orders declaratory and remedial in nature, but also has a duty
to address this violation. This court retains both subject matter
jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the parties as it undertakes
this duty. Both state defendants have been proper parties to
this litigation since its inception and each remain so.116

111. Id. at 391.
112. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 731 S.E.2d 691, 698 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012), vacated, 749 S.E.2d 451 (N.C. 2013).
113. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 749 S.E.2d 451, 454–55 (N.C. 2013).
114. North Carolina Litigation Map, SCHOOLFUNDING: A PROJECT OF THE CTR.
FOR EDUC. EQUITY AT TEACHERS COLL. (2019), http://schoolfunding.info/litigationmap/north-carolina/#1484027095865-59c41679-8ab6 [https://perma.cc/4ZTS-9EME
].
115. Joint Motion for a Case Management and Scheduling Order at 4, Hoke Cty.
Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95 CVS 1158 (Wake County Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2018),
http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/N.Carolina-Joint-Motion2.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5YH-QELP].
116. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95 CVS 1158, slip op. at 6 (Wake County
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2018), http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
Leandro-order-denying-SBE-motion-.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU8Q-QGZ7] (emphasis
in original).
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The judge’s finite words make clear this case is going nowhere;
neither, apparently, are the state’s education woes. In 2014, the
Charlotte Observer reported that North Carolina is still struggling
to effectively address failing schools, and nearly 56% of students are
“at risk of academic failure.”117
One response to the ongoing educational dispute is the
utilization of charter schools. Charter schools began in North
Carolina in 1997 as a compromise between Republican and
Democrat leaders. Both parties wanted to avoid vouchers to private
schools that could potentially further disadvantage minority
students.118 The early requirements of charter schools in North
Carolina reflected a concern for racial imbalance. Some
requirements included a “racial and ethnic mix” that reflected “the
community in which it [was] located,”119 preference to at-risk
children,120 and transportation plans “so that transportation would
not be a barrier to any student who lived within the district of the
charter school.”121 Early in the charter school experiment, the
percentage of minority enrollees was higher than that of the
traditional public schools, but over time that trend began to
change.122 As more White students entered charter schools and the
amount of charter schools tripled, 123 racial imbalance began to
grow. Soon, minority students made up an even smaller portion of
charter schools than traditional public schools. 124

117. Jane Stancill, Too Many NC Children Aren’t Receiving Adequate Education,
Court Filings Say, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 9, 2014, 6:17 AM), https://www.
charlotteobserver.com/news/local/education/article9120011.html
[https://perma.cc/7DK2-54EE].
118. Helen F. Ladd, et al., The Growing Segmentation of the Charter School Sector
in North Carolina 4 (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research,
Working Paper No. 133, Aug. 2015), https://caldercenter.org/sites/default/
files/WP%20133_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9DN-RJAZ].
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id. (“[T]he State Board of Education was encouraged to give preference to
applications that demonstrated the capability of serving students at risk of academic
failure.”).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 6–7.
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id. at 7; see also Valerie Strauss, The Myth of ‘School Choice’ in North
Carolina, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2018 8:19 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/answer-sheet/wp/2018/08/10/the-myth-of-school-choice-in-north-carolina/?ut
m_term=.338f9a8c605c [https://perma.cc/NJ3F-EXXP] (“If our state legislators are
really serious about providing families with good choices, they must enact policies
that move us in the direction of racial and economic integration.”).
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The achievement of charter schools followed a similar trend.
In the early years, many charter school students were being
outperformed by their public school peers, but by 2012 this flipped
with charter school students outperforming public school students
at every grade level.125 One analysis explains that achievement rose
where there was a higher return rate of students, and the schools
with higher return rates had a greater percentage of White students
than minority students.126 It concluded that:
[T]he apparent gains in the test scores of charter school
students over time have far more to do with selection than with
the quality of the programs they offer. Taken together, our
findings imply that the charter schools in North Carolina have
become segmented over time, with one segment increasingly
serving the interests of middle class [sic] [W]hite families.127

ii. Texas Finds Funding System Unequal but Refuses to
Draw a Cost-Quality Relationship.
Texas has been grappling with school finance lawsuits since
the mid-1980s. In Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby,
the Texas Supreme Court found that the school financing system
was unconstitutional because it was neither “financially efficient”
nor did it provide for a “general diffusion of knowledge” as required
by the Texas Constitution.128 “A general diffusion of knowledge
being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the
people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to
establish and make suitable provision for the support and
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.”129 Here,
the financing system, which relied on 42% of funding from the state
and 50% from independent districts, left a disparity of 700 to 1
because of the vast differences in the ability of school districts to
garner funds from property taxes. 130 The court found that despite
the efforts of the legislature,131 this scheme was unconstitutional
125. Ladd et al., supra note 118, at 9, 19–20.
126. Id. at 15, 34–36.
127. Id. at 26.
128. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
129. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
130. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 S.W.2d at 392.
131. Id. at 397 (“By statutory directives, the legislature has attempted through
the years to reduce disparities and improve the system . . . . The legislature’s recent
efforts have focused primarily on increasing the state’s contributions. More money
allocated under the present system would reduce some of the existing disparities
between districts but would at best only postpone the reform that is necessary to
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and inefficient.132 “Efficiency does not require a per capita
distribution, but it also does not allow concentrations of resources
in property-rich school districts that are taxing low when propertypoor districts that are taxing high cannot generate sufficient
revenues to meet even minimum standards.”133 The court
elaborated that “districts must have substantially equal access to
similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.”134
Essentially, the legislature had to work with the individual school
districts to devise a way for all students to have equal access to
education materials while refraining from hiking up property taxes
in poorer districts.135
Sixteen years later, the defendants in Neeley v. West OrangeCove Consolidated Independent School District, claimed the
judiciary’s intrusion on school finance matters in Edgewood left the
legislature and schools on shaky ground, stating “issues of
adequacy, suitability, and efficiency under article VII, section 1 are
all nonjusticiable political questions . . . .”136 The court rejected
these claims, doubling-down on its ruling in Edgewood that the
judiciary is well-equipped to decide whether the legislature has met
its constitutional duty of supplying an adequate education. 137
Furthermore, the court found that the public school financing
system was adequate,138 but that the state’s control of local taxation
for education amounts to a state property tax in violation 139 of the
state constitution.140 The state legislature was once again back at
make the system efficient. A band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be
changed.”).
132. Id. at 399 (“Although we have ruled the school financing system to be
unconstitutional, we do not now instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the
legislation it should enact; nor do we order it to raise taxes. The legislature has
primary responsibility to decide how best to achieve an efficient system.”).
133. Id. at 397.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 777
(Tex. 2005).
137. Id. at 778–79 (“The judiciary is well-accustomed to applying substantive
standards the crux of which is reasonableness . . . . Litigation over the adequacy of
public education may well invite judicial policy-making, but the invitation need not
be accepted.”).
138. Id. at 792–94.
139. Id. at 795 (“[A]n ad valorem tax is a state tax . . . when the State so
completely controls the levy, assessment and disbursement of revenue, either
directly or indirectly, that the authority employed is without meaningful discretion.”)
(quoting Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.,
826 S.W.2d 489, 502 (Tex. 1992)).
140. See TEX. CONST. art. 8, § 1(e) (abolishing ad valorem property taxes).
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the drawing board to devise “structural changes” to the public
education system to provide adequate and equal access to
education.141
Most recently in Morath v. Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness
Coalition, the Texas Supreme Court found, “[d]espite the
imperfections of the current school funding regime, it meets
minimum constitutional requirements.”142 In a 100-page opinion,
the court found the Texas public school system met both the
financial143 and qualitative efficiency requirements;144 students’
achievement satisfied the “general diffusion of knowledge”
requirement;145 and such requirement did not require adequate
funding.146 The court echoed the sentiments of San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, stating, “[t]o determine
as a matter of fact that specific funding levels are required to
achieve the constitutional threshold of a general diffusion of
knowledge, a court not only must find that a cost-quality
relationship exists, but also must assign specific quantitative
measures to that relationship.”147 While the court again rejected the
state’s claims that the political question doctrine prevented the
court from assessing the state’s educational system,148 its broad
ruling on school financing makes a future claim seem unpromising.
B. Third Wave: State Adequacy Lawsuits Have Mixed
Results.
The supreme courts of Kentucky and Kansas have both held
that their respective state has failed to provide adequate education
for students, but the legislatures have differed greatly on how to
implement changes. The Kentucky Supreme Court uses qualitative
criteria to define “adequacy” giving the legislature a roadmap for
the necessary changes. Whereas the Kansas Supreme Court relied
on the already robust state constitution to hold the legislature in
non-compliance for almost a decade.

141.
142.
2016).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 800.
Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex.
See id. at 876.
Id. at 878–79.
Id. at 868.
See id. at 850–51.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 846.
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Kentucky Leads the Way in Adequacy Lawsuits
Through Developing A Strong Definition with
Qualitative Criteria.

Kentucky sets the standard for adequacy in education
lawsuits. In the late-1980s, a group of plaintiffs brought a
declaratory judgment action claiming the school financing system
is inadequate and discriminatory, violating the Equal Protection,
Due Process, and Education Clauses of the Kentucky
Constitution.149 The Education Clause in Kentucky is quite trimmer
than that of Kansas, stating in full: “The General Assembly shall,
by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of
common schools throughout the State.” 150 Here, the legislature also
fought back relying on the separation of powers doctrine, claiming
the question was purely political.151 The court rejected this claim, 152
and in a decisive manner set forth a definition for an “efficient
system of education.”153
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to
provide each and every child with at least the seven following
capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills
to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic,
social, and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that
affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient
self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical
wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each
student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage;
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient
levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.154

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190–91 (Ky. 1989).
KY. CONST. § 183.
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 191.
Id. at 208–09.
Id. at 212.
Id.
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In response to this audacious standard, the legislature enacted
education reforms that increased school funding dramatically. 155
The legislature’s quick and faithful response 156 to the Rose decision
not only benefitted Kentucky students and teachers, but also acted
as a shield in later litigation.157 The seven Rose factors have been
adopted by five other states: Alabama, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Ohio, and Kansas.158
The carefully crafted definition of adequate has improved
student “output measures,”159 but has failed to close achievement
gaps between White and minority students. Thirty years after Rose,
“achievement gaps between student populations continue to be
incredibly disturbing.”160 The 2017–2018 student assessment
results from the Kentucky Department of Education measured
White students nearly doubling Black students in “transition
readiness”161 and significantly outweighing Hispanic students. 162
The gold standard of third wave education litigation has still failed
to close achievement gaps in Kentucky schools.

155. See Kentucky Litigation Map, SCHOOLFUNDING: A PROJECT OF THE CTR. FOR
EDUC. EQUITY TEACHERS COLL., http://schoolfunding.info/litigation-map/kentucky
/#1484023070798-ae032cc2-e640 [https://perma.cc/B4GG-3YYQ].
156. See Susan Perkins Weston & Robert F. Sexton, Substantial and Yet Not
Sufficient: Kentucky’s Effort to Build Proficiency for Each and Every Child, EDUC.,
EQUITY, & LAW, Dec. 2009, at 9.
157. In later litigation, a Kentucky district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim that
funding was inadequate, finding that “output measures indicate that Kentucky is
making substantial progress toward its education goals” and that plaintiffs failed to
show actual, objective inadequacy. Id. at 20–22.
158. See Catharine Hansard, Searching for the Missing Piece: An Examination of
the Constitutional Language in Texas’s Education Clause That Continues to Fuel the
Puzzling School Finance Saga, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. ONLINE EDITION 1, 8 n.49
(2016).
159. Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 868 (Tex.
2016).
160. See Wayne Lewis et al., Achievement Remains Flat, Gaps Persist in Kentucky
Schools, KY. TCHR., (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.kentuckyteacher.org/news/2018
/09/achievement-remains-flat-gaps-persist-in-kentucky-schools/
[https://perma.cc/9RWV-KH56].
161. Id. (“[T]ransition-ready — prepared with knowledge, skills and essential
dispositions to succeed in the next educational setting or career pathway. Students
ready for the next level are transition ready.”).
162. Id. (demonstrating that 65% of White students are transition ready, whereas
only 32% of Black students and 44% of Hispanic students have been designated
transition ready by the Kentucky Department of Education).

188

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38: 1

ii. Kansas Legislature and Supreme Court Continue to
Duel Over Adequacy Requirements.
In November 2010, thirty-nine plaintiffs filed a complaint in
the Kansas district court alleging the state of Kansas grossly
underfunded education in direct violation of the state
constitution.163 Kansas has one of the more robust education
clauses, stating in part, “The legislature shall provide for
intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by
establishing and maintaining public schools . . . .”164 This clause
means, “[t]he Kansas Constitution . . . imposes a mandate that our
educational system cannot be static or regressive but must be one
which ‘advance[s] to a better quality or state.’”165 Plaintiffs’
complaint details the legislature’s continuous failure to meet this
high bar by surreptitiously cutting funding and bleeding Kansas’s
education budget.166 The Kansas Supreme Court has issued seven
opinions in Gannon v. State, most recently in June of 2019. 167 The
court revisited the case after the “legislative passage of 2019 House
163. KAN. CONST., art. VI, § 6(b) (“The legislature shall make suitable provision
for finance of the educational interests of the state . . . .”); Complaint at 17–18,
Gannon v. State, No. 10C1569, 2013 WL 146092 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Jan. 10, 2013), rev’d,
298 Kan. 1107 (2014).
164. KAN. CONST., art. VI, §1.
165. Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 309, supplemented, 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005)
(quoting Improve, in WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 557 (1999)).
166. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1213–14 (Kan. 2014).
167. Gannon v. State, 309 Kan. 1185, 1201 (2019) (finding the State’s legislature
in substantial compliance with previous judicial mandates.); Gannon v. State, 443
P.3d 294, 304 (Kan. 2018) (finding the state’s legislature in substantial compliance
with previous judicial mandates); Gannon v. State, 420 P.3d 477, 488 (Kan. 2018)
(holding the state’s remediation plan “with some financial adjustments” could “bring
the K-12 system into compliance with the adequacy requirement in Article 6 of the
Kansas Constitution.”); Gannon v. State, 402 P.3d 513, 525 (Kan. 2017) (holding the
state again failed to meet its burden to show compliance with “this remedy phase” of
the litigation, but also failed to show its work towards compliance); Gannon v. State,
390 P.3d 461, 488 (Kan. 2017) (holding the CLASS finance system acted as a “stopgap
and merely freeze[s] the K–12 funding levels for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 at the
levels for fiscal year 2015.”); Gannon v. State, 372 P.3d 1181, 1187 (Kan. 2016)
(holding, while H.B. 2655 corrected funding regarding the unconstitutional
inequalities of the capital outlay, other portions of the funding bill remained
unconstitutional); Gannon v. State, 368 P.3d 1024, 1026 (Kan. 2016) (holding the
state failed to demonstrate that it had cured the unconstitutional inequalities of the
capital outlay, and failed to provide supplemental general state aid in an amount
that would allow “aid-receiving districts to provide substantially similar educational
opportunities through tax efforts similar to their wealthier counterparts.”); Gannon
v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1236–37 (Kan. 2014) (holding that the adequacy requirement
in the education clause would be met if the financing system was “reasonably
calculated to have all Kansas public education students meet or exceed the standards
set out in Rose and presently codified in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 72-1127.”).
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Substitute for Senate Bill 16 (S.B. 16), which the Governor signed
into law on April 6, 2019.”168 The court found that the new
legislation addressed their lingering concerns from 2018, when the
court stated, “with some financial adjustments” the legislature’s
current bill could satisfy the constitutional mandate. 169 S.B. 16
added approximately $90 million to education each year from 2019
to 2023, specifically addressing inflation and virtual school state
aid.170 However, the court retained jurisdiction over the case “to
ensure continued implementation of the scheduled funding”171
(citing specifically to a 2018 “legislative attempt to reclaim
educational funds . . . .”).172
In April 2018, the Kansas House Judiciary Committee
“narrowly advanced a measure that would declare ‘the power to
establish adequacy of financing for education as exclusively within
the legislative power of the state.’” 173 Essentially, this measure
attempts to prevent the court from evaluating the legislature’s
compliance with the financing section of the Education Clause of
the Kansas Constitution, by amending the state’s constitution.174 As
Senator Julia Lynn stated, “I think as long as we let this go on, as
long as we let the court push us around and come over and do our
jobs, th[ere] . . . will never be enough money.”175 This aggressive
measure did not make it to the ballot in November 2018, but the
court clearly deemed it a continuous threat to the litigation as the
Kansas legislature grounded their rebellion in the separation of

168. Gannon, 309 Kan. 1185, 1186 (2019).
169. Gannon, 420 P.3d at 488 (holding the State’s remediation plan “with some
financial adjustments” could “bring the K-12 system into compliance with the
adequacy requirement in Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution.”).
170. Gannon, 309 Kan. at 1193–98.
171. Id. at 1201. Plaintiffs pointed to an attempt by the legislature to reclaim
educational funding during the 2018 session as support for their argument that the
court should retain jurisdiction.
172. Id.
173. Hunter Woodall, Constitutional Amendment on Education Funding Heads to
the House Floor, KAN. CITY STAR (Apr. 4, 2018 8:09 PM), https://www.kansasci
ty.com/news/politics-government/article207953054.html [https://perma.cc/259U-ML
RK].
174. See Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Conservatives Renew Push for a
Constitutional Amendment on Schools after Ruling, WICHITA EAGLE (June 26, 2018
5:57 PM), https://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article213856059.html
[https://perma.cc/3RLT-JS9L] (explaining the proposed constitutional amendment
that will limit judicial oversight of education finance).
175. Dion Lefler et al., Kansas School Funding Still Inadequate, Supreme Court
Says, KAN. CITY STAR (June 25, 2018), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politicsgovernment/article213797099.html [https://perma.cc/G8TF-79LE].
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powers theory. The Court clapped back, stating “[i]nherently the
supreme court must have the power to protect its own jurisdiction,
its own process, its own proceedings, its own orders, and its own
judgments.”176
C. Fourth Wave: Federal Right to Adequate Education Is
Hopeful but Not Optimistic.
Michigan students brought a federal claim for a right to
literacy. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the case demonstrates
the beginning of a new wave of litigation: a federal right to an
adequate education.
i.

Michigan Tests the Waters of Federal Adequacy Right.

In 2016, seven students in Detroit brought an action against
the State of Michigan, specifically claiming that literacy is a
fundamental right under the federal constitution, which they have
been denied.177 The complaint alleged the state’s failure to create
“any system for literacy instruction and remediation in Plaintiffs’
schools.”178 Additionally, the complaint used test scores and
statistical data to show that the “Priority Schools”179 that Plaintiffs
attend are continuously in the bottom tier of Michigan schools,
ranking only one to six percent out of a hundred.180 The complaint
also alleged unsafe conditions and vermin infestations inside these

176. Gannon, 443 P.3d at 304 (quoting Chi., Kan. & W. R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of
Chase Cty., 21 P. 1071, 1071 (Kan. 1989)). The Court also cited to Montoy v. State, a
previous school finance case where the court held “the State had enacted legislation
in substantial compliance with our orders . . . . And we dismissed the case. Before
the State fully implemented the financial solution we accepted in Montroy IV,
however, it started making significant cuts to education funding in school
year . . . 2008–09 (fiscal year 2009).” Id. at 296 (citing Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755
(Kan. 2006).
177. Snyder Complaint, supra note 103, at 24–25.
178. Id. at 73.
179. Id. at 20 (“Priority Schools are those schools in the bottom 5% of a complete
top-to-bottom list of schools published annually. The ranking is based on a number
of factors, including minimal students outcomes in a number of subject areas, low
achievement coupled with declining performance or large achievement gaps, or a
combination of multiple of these factors.”).
180. Id. at 66–67 (“A school’s percentile rank reflects how the school ranks against
all other schools in the State. For example, a score of 70 means that the school
performed better than 70% of Michigan’s ranked schools . . . . Plaintiffs’ schools are
among the very lowest-performing schools in the State. For the most recent ranking,
the 2013-2014 school year, the State assigned Hamilton a 4 percentile rank; Osborn
MST a 1 percentile rank; Osborn Evergreen a 2 percentile rank; and Cody MCH a 6
percentile rank.”).
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schools.181 After detailed examples of how these Detroit schools are
failing Plaintiffs, the complaint puts forth data showing graduation
rates,182 employment rates,183 and health studies184 all indicating
literacy plays a fundamental role on an individual’s life and affects
the community at large.
Despite the surplus of information, Plaintiffs’ complaint was
dismissed with prejudice.185 The court held that Plaintiffs failed to
compare other Michigan schools with different racial compositions
demonstrating that the schools Plaintiffs attended, comprised
largely of children of color, were treated differently than schools
with a greater population of White students.186 Therefore, they
failed to demonstrate that they were treated differently on account
of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 187
Additionally, the court held that the state was not required to
provide a minimally adequate level of education, and there was no
fundamental right to literacy under the Due Process Clause. 188
This first attempt at a federal adequacy right proved
disappointing for Plaintiffs. In many states the claims would have
been better brought under a state education clause, but the
Michigan Constitution does little more than encourage education:189
“Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means
of education shall forever be encouraged.” 190 The Michigan
Constitution goes on to mandate a free education 191 and enumerate
the duties of the State Board of Education, 192 but nowhere does it
181. Id. at 10, 77–98.
182. Id. at 70–73.
183. Id. at 34–35 (“Adults with low literacy face a significant economic
disadvantage, earning lower wages and experiencing higher unemployment rates.
NAAL data reveals that 43% of adults with the lowest levels of literacy live in
poverty, as compared to only 4% of those with the highest levels of literacy.”).
184. Id. at 37–39 (citing Terry C. Davis et al., Low Literacy and Violence Among
Adolescents in a Summer Sports Program, 24 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 401, 411
(1999) (“One study of adolescents from low-income neighborhoods found that youth
who read two years or more below grade level were more likely to engage in risky
behaviors and be in a physical fight that required medical treatment than youth who
were reading at grade level.”).
185. Gary v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 369 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
186. Id. at 367–68.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 365.
189. MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 2.
192. Id. § 3.
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provide for an ‘adequate’ or any other measured type of education.
Because the education clause here provides little instruction to the
legislature or to the courts, young Michigan adults who cannot
read193 have no remedy under the state or United States
Constitution.
IV. Minnesota’s Civil Rights Legacy Turns Disappointing in
Late Twentieth Century, but Cruz-Guzman Has the
Capacity to Right Past Wrongs.
Cruz-Guzman provides an opportunity for Minnesota to return
to its proud legacy of civil rights after decades of segregated
facilities plaguing educational stability. The court decisively ruled
on foundational issues allowing Cruz-Guzman to continue to the
next phase of litigation.
A. Minnesota Legislature Abandons Promise to
Desegregate.
Minnesota has long been one of the greatest champions for
civil rights,194 carrying that title through the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.195 For many years, Minnesota sought to make
the sentiments of Brown a reality for school children.196 In the 1980s
and 90s, however, regression began to plague the Twin Cities and
segregation became a familiar reality. In a series of unfortunate but
predictable, events, the Minnesota legislature and school boards
began moving further away from a unitary school system. 197
In 1972, Minneapolis was subject to a desegregation order,
stemming from Booker v. Special School District No. 1.198 Following
193. See Alia Wong, Students in Detroit are Suing the State Because They Weren’t
Taught to Read, ATLANTIC (July 6, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com
/education/archive/2018/07/no-right-become-literate/564545/ [https://perma.cc/QSG4
-DYUK] (discussing reasons for dismissal).
194. See MYRON ORFIELD, INST. OF METRO. OPPORTUNITY, INTEGRATION AND NEWSEGREGATION IN MINNESOTA: DRAFT REPORT, 5 (2018) [hereinafter ORFIELD].
195. Id. at 1, 9–16.
196. Id. at 16.
197. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968) (“The
transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate
end to be brought about . . . .”).
198. Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No.1, 351 F. Supp 799, 809 (D. Minn 1972); Brief
of Amicus Curiae Myron Orfield at 4, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2017) (No. A16-1265) [hereinafter Orfield Brief]; INST. OF METRO.
OPPORTUNITY, WHY ARE THE TWIN CITIES SO SEGREGATED? 5 (2015),
https://www.law.umn.edu/sites/law.umn.edu/files/metro-files/why-are-the-twincities-so-segregated-2-26-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NVR-4GWK].
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that decision, “the court helped guide policies such as school
boundary decisions, and conducted annual reviews of the district’s
progress towards integration.”199 A ‘short’ ten years later, the
desegregation order dissolved without a ruling that Minneapolis
schools were “integrated or unitary.”200 Without the order and with
a noticeable uptick in minority student populations, districts began
to re-segregate.201 In response, the Minnesota State Board of
Education proposed a desegregation rule that used “flexible racial
ratios as integration targets.”202 A wave of “political backlash”
destroyed these proposals and forced the Board to dismantle.203
Later in 1998, a new Statement of Need and Reasonableness
(SONAR)204 was released that starkly contradicted the 1978
version205 released after Booker.
The SONAR’s rendering of the law would flip the logic of many
integration plans on their head: rather than being mandatory
in cases of de jure segregation, and voluntarily implementable
elsewhere, race-conscious remedies would be forbidden in all
cases except where there was proof of intentional
discrimination. Most voluntary integration plans would become
illegal.206

De facto segregation of students would become the harsh
reality across Minnesota schools. During the following two decades,
199. Orfield Brief, supra note 198, at 4.
200. ORFIELD, supra note 194, at 6 (citing Memorandum Order at 5, Booker v.
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 4–71 Civil 282) (June 8, 1983)) (“The Minneapolis
desegregation order was dissolved in 1983, in order give [sic] the district ‘the
opportunity for autonomous compliance with constitutional standards.’ Notably, the
court did not find that the Minneapolis school district was integrated or unitary, and
received assurances that the State Department of Education was ‘willing and able to
assume the duty of monitoring the further implementation of the District’s
desegregation/integration plan.’”) (internal citations omitted).
201. Id. at 6.
202. Id. at 6–7.
203. Id. at 7–8.
204. See Minn. Dep’t of Educ., Statement of Need and Reasonableness for
Proposed Amendments to Rules Governing Desegregation (1998) [hereinafter
SONAR 1998].
205. Orfield Brief, supra note 198, at 4–5. (“In a 1978 Statement of Need and
Reasonableness (SONAR) supporting a rule regulating de facto school segregation,
the Attorney General and the Board of Education declared that, reading the 1869
prohibition on segregation in pari materia with the 1967 Minnesota Human Rights
Act, the legislature’s intent to regulate de facto discrimination was clear.”).
206. Id. at 9 (citing Margaret Hobday et al., A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota’s
Failed Experiment with Choice-Based Integration, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 936,
955–58 (2009)).
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the Minnesota legislature and Department of Education 207
continued to weaken the State’s ability to correct rampant
segregation occurring across school districts. 208 Today, the 1999
Minnesota Desegregation/Integration Rule, 209 adopting the 1998
SONAR requirements, remains the authority on Minnesota
desegregation.210
Coincidently, in 1993, Minnesota became one of a growing
number of states to find a fundamental right to education in the
state constitution.211 In Skeen v. State, the Minnesota Supreme
Court decided a school financing case that included seventy-six
school districts, where the plaintiffs were complaining that the
increase of student population in their districts in comparison to the
decrease in population of other districts led to “disparities in
educational opportunity” based on the current financing scheme. 212
However, the plaintiffs did not “challenge . . . the adequacy of
education in Minnesota,” because the plaintiff districts all “met or
exceeded the educational requirements of the state.” 213 Nor, were
inner-city districts, like Minneapolis, St. Paul, or Duluth, parties to
the case,214 because the State placed a “higher property tax rate on
commercial entities.”215 The Minnesota Supreme Court found the
state’s financing system was constitutional in all respects, but also
held that “education is a fundamental right under the state
constitution.”216 This decision is important because it provides an
avenue through which future education litigation may be brought.
207. The State Board of Education was dismantled among the “political backlash”
that spurred from the Board’s proposal in 1994 where they would have the authority
to define “racial balance” and “equal educational opportunities.” See id. at 21–22.
208. Id. at 9–15; Margaret C. Hobday et. al., A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota’s
Failed Experiment with Choice-Based Integration, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 936,
938 (2009). Contra Cindy Lavorato & Frank Spencer, Back to the Future with RaceBased Mandates: A Response to Missed Opportunity, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1747,
1751 (2010) (arguing the current Desegregation/Integration rule is sufficient to
encourage diversity of public schools).
209. See Minn. R. 3535.0100–.0180 (2009).
210. In 2015 the Department of Education released a new SONAR defending a
proposed rule that failed to strengthen desegregation efforts and in many ways
weakened the previous rule. The one positive provision mandated charter schools
would now have to be in compliance with the rule. However, this rule never passed.
Minnesota desegregation is still governed by the 1999 rule. See ORFIELD, supra note
194, at 25–26.
211. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993).
212. Id. at 303.
213. Id. at 302.
214. Id. at 302–03.
215. Id. at 302.
216. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
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B. Promising New Case Could Right Old Wrongs.
In Cruz-Guzman v. State the court held in a sweeping victory
for plaintiffs that their claims under the education, due process, and
equal protection clauses of the Minnesota Constitution were
justiciable. 217 Additionally, the legislature was not protected by the
speech or debate clause, nor were school districts necessary parties
to this litigation. These promising rulings on foundational issues
indicate the court will be receptive to the claims that segregation
alone can create an inadequate education.
i.

Claims Brought under the Education Clause Were
Justiciable.

Plaintiffs alleged that the hyper-segregation of public schools,
particularly in Minneapolis and St. Paul, have led to disparities in
achievement.218 It is because of these conditions that the plaintiffs
claim the legislature has failed to meet its duty under the education
clause, which states in full:
The stability of a republican form of government depending
mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the
legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public
schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by taxation
or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of
public schools throughout the state.219

The state contended that Plaintiffs’ complaints raise a purely
political question and thus are not justiciable.220 The Minnesota
Supreme Court held otherwise using previous case law to illustrate
the many times the court has been asked to interpret the education
clause.221 The court concluded that the judiciary was entitled to
“adjudicate whether the Legislature has satisfied its constitutional
duty under the Education Clause,” because if it were not that would
“leave Education Clause claims without a remedy.” 222 It is the
judiciary’s duty to interpret the constitution and adjudicate

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2018).
Id. at 6, 7–10.
MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 7.
Id. at 7–10.
Id. at 9.
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whether the legislature and other rule-making authorities are in
compliance with that constitution.223
ii. Claims Brought under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses Were Justiciable.
Plaintiffs alleged the state denied students’ fundamental right
to an adequate education by violating the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Minnesota Constitution.224 The state
contended that there was no “qualitative component” to the
education clause which defined “adequate.” Thus, for the court to
rule on Petitioners’ equal protection and due process claims, it
would need to define an “adequate education” and engage in
educational policy-making.225 The court again rejected the state’s
contentions and relied on Skeen, stating:
The fundamental right recognized in Skeen was not merely a
right to anything that might be labeled as “education,” but
rather, a right to a general and uniform system of education
that is thorough and efficient, that is supported by sufficient
and uniform funding, and that provides an adequate education
to
all
students
in
Minnesota.226

The court did not define “adequate” in any more certain terms
than previous case law, but it did establish that it was well within
the judiciary’s power to “assess whether constitutional
requirements have been met and whether appellants’ fundamental
right to an adequate education has been violated.” 227
iii. The Legislature Is Not Protected by the Speech or
Debate Clause When Defending Claims under the
Education, Equal Protection, or Due Process Clauses.
The state contended that the legislature must be dismissed
from the suit because the speech or debate clause “provides
immunity from suit for any actions taken in their legislative
capacity.”228 The clause reads as follows:

223. Id. at 8–10; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial
review).
224. See MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 7.
225. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 11.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 12.
228. Id. at 13.

2020]

Inherently Unequal

197

The members of each house in all cases except treason, felony
and breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during
the session of their respective houses and in going to or
returning from the same. For any speech or debate in either
house they shall not be questioned in any other place.229

The court strongly rejected the full immunity of the legislature
from any suit that arises under their legislative capacity.
Explaining that the speech or debate clause has been interpreted to
grant immunity for defamation when “discharg[ing] [ ] their official
duties,”230 but does not “provide[] them with absolute immunity for
violating a duty that the constitution specifically imposes on the
Legislature.”231 The court held that it will not interpret the speech
or debate clause “to immunize the Legislature from meeting its
obligation under more specific constitutional provisions—the
Education, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses.” 232
iv. School Districts and Charter Schools Were Not
Required as Necessary Parties.
The state contended that plaintiffs’ claims “directly implicate[
] actions only school districts and charter schools can take,” 233 thus
without these parties the case cannot proceed. In doing so, the state
relied on section 555.11 of the Minnesota Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, and Rule 19 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure.234 The former states, “[w]hen declaratory relief is
sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
proceeding.”235 Because the school districts and charter schools
would be directly affected by the declaratory judgment of the court
and any remedy sought by the plaintiffs would affect how the school
districts and charter schools conducted business, the state argued
that they should be parties to the suit. 236 The court agreed with the
district court, which stated the plaintiffs are “seeking ‘remedies
229. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
230. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 13 (quoting Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 62
(Minn. 2010)).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (alteration in original).
234. Id.
235. MINN. STAT. § 555.11 (2016); Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 13–14.
236. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 14.
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from the State, not individual school districts or charter schools,’”
and are thus not necessary parties. 237 The court used the same
reasoning when dismissing the state’s contentions under Rule 19,238
stating “school districts and charter schools are not indispensable
parties when relief is sought solely from the State.” 239
Consequently, the suit could continue forward without joining
school districts or charter schools as parties.
V. Let’s Try This Again: Separate Educational Facilities
Are Inherently Unequal.
To provide an adequate education to all Minnesota students,
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Cruz-Guzman must first issue a
desegregation order to apply broadly and become effective
immediately. Second, the court should define “adequate” education
to provide the legislature with tangible grounds for effectuating
change and provide plaintiffs with multiple avenues for relief.
A. Ordering Desegregation
The Minnesota Supreme Court should order the legislature to
develop a desegregation plan statewide. First, the correlation
between segregated schools and inadequate education has a long
and sordid history. Second, the court only lifted its original
segregation order240 because the state had assured the court it
would continue to desegregate Minnesota schools, which it has
failed to do.241
Sixty-five years ago, in Brown v. Board of Education, the
effects of school segregation were first chronicled: “[t]o separate
[children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone.”242 While the opponents of school
237. Id. (quoting Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W. 2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017)).
238. MINN. R. CIV. P. 19.01.
239. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 15.
240. See Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972), aff’d,
585 F.2d 347, 350 (8th Cir. 1978); see also Orfield Brief, supra note 198, at 6.
241. See supra notes 200–201, 208, and accompanying text.
242. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see also Snyder
Complaint, supra note 103, at 70 (“As social science research demonstrates, low
academic achievement and a personal perception of incompetency negatively impact
student motivation, engagement, and mental health, which frequently lead to
dropping out.”), dismissed with prejudice, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018). See
generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INST. OF MED., ENGAGING SCHOOLS: FOSTERING
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integration reform point to de-facto segregation as the result of
choice, it is the same as sanctioned243 segregation by law, when the
state could do something to prevent it, but chooses not to. When
Minneapolis was first ordered by Judge Larson to desegregate its
public schools,244 there was no law on the books permitting
segregation. Quite the contrary, Minnesota enacted legislation to
prohibit racial segregation in public schools as early as 1869,245 and
a statute has continued the prohibition. 246 Regardless, Minneapolis
schools were found to be operating under de-facto segregation and
were ordered to integrate.247 The state of the law has not changed.
Segregation is still illegal, and de facto segregation warrants a court
order to integrate, whether that be in 1972 or 2019.
Furthermore, the continued segregation of Minnesota schools
will cost the state more money in the long term than spending the
money now to fix the broken system.248 The Center on Society and
Health at Virginia Commonwealth University found that “[r]acial
segregation reduces educational and job opportunities and is
associated with worse health outcomes.” 249 This translates to a
continuously growing class of individuals that cannot secure wellpaying jobs and are forced to depend on government programs,
resulting in higher taxes for everyone. 250 The deficit between the
classes will continue to grow and without a strong middle class the
economy will become unstable.

HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS’ MOTIVATION TO LEARN 13–44 (2004) (describing factors and
supports that motivate students to engage); Fred M. Newmann et al., The
Significance and Sources of Student Engagement, in STUDENT ENGAGEMENT AND
ACHIEVEMENT IN AMERICAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 11–39 (Fred M. Newmann ed.,
1992) (describing what engagement is, factors that affect engagement, and why
students become disengaged).
243. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (“Segregation of [W]hite and colored children in
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”) (internal
citations omitted).
244. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
245. Orfield Brief, supra note 198, at 2–3.
246. Id. at 2–3.
247. Id. at 4.
248. See VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV., WHY EDUCATION, supra note 32, at 5
(“[U]nderperforming schools and discrimination affect not only educational outcomes
but also economic success, the social environment, personal behaviors, and access to
quality health care.”)
249. Id. at 4; see also supra notes 32–38 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
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The Minnesota Department of Education fell short on their
promises to “assume the duty of monitoring the further
implementation of the District’s desegregation/integration plan.” 251
Where the court lifted the desegregation order to allow the school
district “the opportunity for autonomous compliance with
constitutional standards,”252 the court should be equally willing to
impose an order where—after thirty years—Minnesota schools are
still unconstitutionally segregated.
B. Defining Adequacy
The Minnesota Supreme Court should define “adequate,” so
that the legislature is better equipped to address each factor and
develop policies to effectuate change. This definition would force the
legislature and school boards to look beyond the financing schemes
and instead place a premium on what is actually at stake: the
fundamental right to an education. The court could adopt the Rose
factors,253 or create its own definition by expanding the precedent
discussed in Cruz-Guzman.254
First, if the court adopted Rose, the state would have seven
factors to measure each grade-level, school, and district. This
adoption would enable claims, like that in Cruz-Guzman, to
demonstrate a lack of qualitative criteria to support the assertion
that segregative schooling results in inadequate education. For
example, where only 23% of Minneapolis’s Black students
“demonstrated a proficiency in reading,” 255 which is a fundamental
building block to “sufficient oral and written communication
skills,”256 there would be a per se violation of the first Rose factor.
Additionally, with each factor the state could develop testing
criteria to gauge student achievement. Likewise, where graduation
rates for students of color are disproportionately lower than those
of White students,257 then they would not be as equipped to
251. Orfield Brief, supra note 198, at 6 (quoting Memorandum Order at 4, Booker
v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 4-71 Civil 282 (June 8, 1983)).
252. Id. at 6 (quoting Memorandum Order at 5, Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No.
1, 4-71 Civil 282 (June 8, 1983)).
253. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190–91 (Ky. 1989).
254. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 11–12 (Minn. 2018).
255. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 17.
256. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
257. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 14, at 19–20 (“Segregation by race and
socioeconomic status in the Minneapolis and Saint Paul public schools has also
resulted in low graduation rates for students of color. In 2014, while the overall high
school graduation rate for the Minneapolis public schools was 58.7 percent, the

2020]

Inherently Unequal

201

“compete favorabl[y] . . . in academics or in the job market”258 as
similarly situated students nationwide, thus failing the seventh
Rose factor. The Rose factors would provide plaintiffs an avenue for
litigation that is not currently available. Without defining
adequacy, plaintiffs are left to compare test scores from surrounding
areas, drawing inferences of inadequacy from the achievement gap.
Second, the court appeared poised to define “adequate” in
Cruz-Guzman and could expand on their reasoning to establish a
definition. The court began by finding the fundamental right to an
education established in Skeen “was not merely a right to anything
that might be labeled as ‘education,’” 259 nor could the government
“‘herd children in an open field to hear lectures by illiterates.’” 260
Instead the fundamental right to an education was found in the
Minnesota Constitution which has at least three qualifiers for the
type of education and school system: (1) intelligent people, (2)
general and uniform, (3) thorough and efficient. 261 When the
Education Clause begins with an impetus on the “intelligence of the
people,”262 then “[t]he framers could not have intended for the
Legislature to create a system of schools that was ‘general and
uniform’ and ‘thorough and efficient’ but that produced a wholly
inadequate education.”263
The court also pointed to the long history of adequacy
expectations in Minnesota which began in 1871, when the court
stated, “all may be enabled to acquire an education which will fit
them to discharge intelligently their duties as citizens of the
republic.”264 In this technological age, the duties of citizens have
changed tremendously. No longer are positions in unskilled labor

graduation rate for Black (not of Hispanic origin) students was 47.3 percent, for
Native American students 29.2 percent, and for Hispanic students 45.1 percent.
White students had a graduation rate of 77.3 percent. In 2014, while the overall high
school graduation rate for the Saint Paul public schools was 75.5 percent, the
graduation rate for Black (not of Hispanic origin) students was 68.8 percent, for
Native American students 51.5 percent, and for Hispanic students 69.4 percent.
White students had a graduation rate of 83.6 percent. The statewide graduation rate
for Minnesota was 81.2 percent.”).
258. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; see also Bailey, supra note 39, at 77–78 (comparing
wages of those with high school degrees and those with bachelor’s degrees).
259. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 11.
260. Id. at 12 (quoting Sheff v. O’Neil, 678 A.2d 1267, 1292 (Conn. 1996)).
261. MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
262. Id.
263. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 12.
264. Id. at 8 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Sauk Ctr. v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412, 416 (1871)).
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plentiful, nor do they provide a living wage.265 Additionally, young
Black and Hispanic men are disproportionately represented in high
school dropout rates which significantly reduces their potential
income while exponentially raising the likelihood of
incarceration.266 Not only is this incongruent with “all may be
enabled to acquire an education,” but it also puts a greater financial
burden on society 267 as opposed to equipping citizens with the
ability to contribute to society, or to “discharge intelligently their
duties as citizens of the republic.” 268 The interpretation of the
Education Clause in 1871 should ring true today. The lack of
qualitative criteria, however, has allowed the state to become
complacent and the fundamental right to an education hollow.
The court has the tools and the authority to craft a definition
of “adequacy” using the Minnesota Constitution and legal
precedent. In Cruz-Guzman, the court further acknowledged its role
in defining terms in the constitution by stating it “is an intrinsic
part of our power to interpret the meaning of the constitution’s
language . . . . The very act of defining the terms used in the
Education Clause and determining whether the constitutional
requirements have been met inevitably requires a measure of
qualitative assessment.”269
If the court defined “adequacy” with qualitative criteria, three
results would occur. First, plaintiffs would have an avenue to
pursue litigation where the criteria are not met, and the legislature
could be protected where marked improvement in defined areas
supports its efforts to correct the wrong. 270 Second, the first line of
defense for the state would no longer be what is adequate and where
does it say that in the Minnesota Constitution? Instead, judicial
precedent would clearly establish what the legislature’s duty is in
relationship to a student’s fundamental right to an education.
Third, a clear definition of “adequacy” would provide future
plaintiffs an avenue for relief. Where the continued segregation of
minority students and inadequate education, not financing, are in
question, the claim would be even more direct by establishing how
segregated schools repeatedly fail to meet the qualitative criteria of
adequacy. No longer would plaintiffs rely on inferences, but instead
would show the failings of particular factors of the definition, and
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See supra notes 39, 40–46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20–30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20–30 and accompanying text.
Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 12.
Id.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.

2020]

Inherently Unequal

203

the legislature would have to grapple with the true causes of the
failings rather than skirting the issue and pointing to financing
schemes.
Conclusion
Segregation in education continues to plague the United
States. Minnesota should be the first to issue a strict desegregation
order and reclaim its proud tradition of leading the way for civil
rights.271 With a hopeful glance towards the future, Cruz-Guzman
provides much needed relief to the students in the Minneapolis and
St. Paul school districts. In a footnote, the court stated:
It is self-evident that a segregated system of public schools is
not “general,” “uniform,” “thorough,” or “efficient . . . .”
Regardless of whether the context is a “traditional” segregation
claim or a different type of claim, courts are well equipped to
decide whether a school system is segregated, and have made
such determinations since Brown . . . .272

These discrete but poignant words emphasize the Court’s
power to protect Minnesotan school-children from the devastative
effects of segregation. Cruz-Guzman provides Minnesota an
opportunity to again lead the nation in Civil Rights.273 On remand,
the court should uphold the ideals laid out in Brown—separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal—and move towards an
education system that promotes equal opportunities for success to
all students.

271. See supra notes 194–196.
272. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 10 n.6.
273. Id. at 15. Cruz-Guzman is no longer the only case that challenges the effects
of segregation on school children. In May 2018 a complaint was filed in New Jersey
mirroring that of Cruz-Guzman. It alleges that the unlawful segregation by “race,
ethnicity and poverty unconstitutionally deprives the State’s public school students
of [a] thorough and efficient education . . . .” Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
and Other Relief at 31, Latino Action Network v. State, No. L-001076-18 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. May 17, 2018). The case was looking at early settlement, potentially
avoiding trial, but after negotiations fell through plaintiff attorneys are again
pursuing litigation for a ruling on “liability at least.” Telephone Interview with Gary
Stein, former New Jersey Associate Justice and Partner at Pashman Stein Walder
Hayden, P.C. (Apr. 18, 2019) (on file with author).

